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Complementarity
JEFFREY L. BLEICH*
This report provides a preliminary analysis of the complementar-
ity provisions of the most recent International Law Committee (ILC)
Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This report is
intended to stimulate discussion of the treatment of complementarity
by the ILC, and is not intended to reflect any formal conclusion of the
International Law Association (ILA) Working Group.
I. BACKGROUND
The principle of "complementarity" concerns the allocation of juris-
diction between domestic courts and the ICC. The scope of "comple-
mentarity" - i.e., the extent to which a domestic court may claim ex-
clusive jurisdiction over a case implicating the Court's powers and
vice-versa - is relevant to any prosecution of a person alleged to have
committed an international crime, who is simultaneously subject to the
domestic jurisdiction of a state respecting that same crime.
Because complementarity questions can arise only in cases where
both the Court and a State have not only the capacity, but the intent
to prosecute the same crime, complementarity presupposes that there
is a subset of "interested States" with an interest in prosecuting these
cases. States which may have an interest in applying their own domes-
tic laws and procedures in such cases include: (1) the State in which
the crime occurred; (2) the State(s) in which the victim(s) and/or the
accused reside; (3) the State(s) in which the victim(s) and/or the ac-
cused resided at the time of the crime, and/or; (4) the State(s) of na-
tionality for the victim(s) and/or the accused. To resolve whether any
of these States may claim precedence over the prosecution of an inter-
national crime, the ILC Draft Statute must address five issues.
1. What factors define an "interested State" for purposes of chal-
lenging ICC jurisdiction;
2. As between two competent forums, the ICC and the domestic
court of an interested State, which forum has priority;
3. What standard shall apply for determining the competency of a
domestic forum;
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4. Who has the burden of proof in determining whether a domestic
forum is competent;
5. What institution will ultimately resolve whether a domestic fo-
rum is competent, and at what stage of the proceedings.
These issues are addressed with varying degrees of clarity in the ILC
Draft Statute.
II. THE ILC DRAF STATUTE
The principle of complementarity appears in the preamble of the
ILC draft statute, and is implicated by other provisions of the draft.'
The third paragraph of the preamble of the ILC draft statute provides,
essentially, that the ICC may assert jurisdiction only where domestic
court jurisdiction is not "available," or domestic court proceedings
would be "ineffective." "[The] court is intended to be complementary to
national criminal justice systems in cases where such trial procedures
may not be available or may be ineffective."2 The Statute as drafted
thus reflects a general consensus that the ICC should not supplant na-
tional judicial authorities, but may only complement these authorities.
As discussed in more detail below, although there is agreement
that the ICC Statute should give preference to "effective" domestic fo-
rums over the ICC, there is significant disagreement about how this
principle will be accomplished.
The Draft Statute provides that the ICC may be seized with a
matter or investigation based upon either a State complaint or a refer-
ral by Article 25 of the Security Council. Following such an investiga-
tion, the ICC prosecutor would have authority to issue an arrest war-
rant. Under Article 53, a State party served with a warrant for the
arrest and transfer of an accused international criminal "shall ...
take immediate steps to arrest and transfer the accused to the Court."3
Depending upon the circumstances, "a State may have discretion to ex-
tradite the accused to a requesting State or refer the case to its compe-
tent authorities for the purpose of prosecution."4 A State party may,
within 45 days of receiving such a request, file a written application to
set aside the request.5
Outside of States challenging requests for arrest and transfer, the
Draft Statute does not directly address the issue of which States are
"interested" for purposes of challenging the Court's jurisdiction. As a
1. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth
Session, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter
1994 ILC Draft]. Complementarity principles are, as noted infra, also implicated by Arti-
cles 25, 34, 35, 36, 42, 53, 54, and 56.
2. Id. pmble., 3.
3. Id. art. 53(2Xa).
4. Id. art. 53(2)(b)-(c).
5. Id. art. 53(6).
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general matter, Article 53 confers jurisdiction to a State in which the
accused resides at the time an investigation begins. Article 21 suggests
that domestic jurisdiction is based upon traditional international law
concepts, and thus a State may assert jurisdiction based either on ter-
ritoriality (i.e., if the accused is within its borders, or if the act oc-
curred within its borders) or based on nationality (if the accused is a
national).
To the extent that a party with jurisdiction wishes to challenge
the Court's jurisdiction on the ground that an "effective" and "availa-
ble" trial procedure exists within its domestic system, that party must
proceed under Article 34. Article 34 provides that a State may chal-
lenge the ICC's jurisdiction only prior to or at the commencement of
the trial.6
Article 35 provides that the Court shall decide the ultimate ques-
tion of whether a domestic forum affords an "effective" and "available"
procedure for prosecuting the crime; the Court should refrain from pro-
ceeding with the matter if a State has investigated a matter and made
an "apparently well-founded" decision not to proceed, or if the matter
"is under investigation by a State which has or may have jurisdiction
over it, and there is no reason for the Court to take further action."7
The Court must give the State complainant or the accused a hearing
on these issues.8
Finally, the Act provides that a decision by the Court to exercise
jurisdiction will have preclusive effect against domestic proceedings for
the same offense.9 Article 42(1) contains a "non bis in idem" provision,
which protects a person tried by the Court from "double jeopardy" by
barring subsequent prosecution in domestic fora for the same interna-
tional crimes.
III. GENERAL CONCERNS REGARDING THE CuRRENT DRAFT
The phrasing of the ILC's complementarity provisions has been
criticized for failing to clarify: (1) the extent to which the ICC may
claim jurisdiction over an action arguably within the competence of a
domestic court; (2) the burden of proof, timing, and standard for decid-
ing that a domestic judicial authority is unavailable or ineffective; and
(3) the effect of such a determination upon domestic court proceedings.
These general concerns are addressed in turn.
6. Id. art. 34(b). An accused or the Court itself, however, may question its jurisdic-
tion at any time up until the conclusion of the trial. Id. arts. 34(b), 35(b).
7. Id. art. 35.
8. Id. art. 36.
9. Id. art. 42.
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A. The Authority of the ICC to Determine the Adequacy of State
Forums
Some States, including the United States, China, and Japan, have
expressed concern that - as presently written - the ICC could uni-
laterally determine that it has a superior capacity to prosecute crimes
already being prosecuted by domestic courts.'0 However, the nature of
these concerns varies. China, for example, is reluctant to give the ICC
authority to decide the issue of its own jurisdiction, and would prefer
that this decision be left to domestic courts or possibly the Security
Council." The United States does not object to the ICC having the
ability to decide its own jurisdiction in principle, but would endorse
this power only if the challenges to jurisdiction are available at all
stages (including the investigative stage), and the ICC has limited dis-
cretion to assert jurisdiction over a State's objection. 2
The United States proposes that Articles 25-27 be amended to give
States standing to object to any investigation by the ICC prosecutor
that might interfere with a legitimate national investigation or prose-
cution. The United States also believes that the universe of interested
States with standing to object to ICC jurisdiction may vary depending
upon the nature of the crime. The United States appears to favor a re-
gime under which the State of nationality of the victim or accused may
be deemed a "more interested State" than the State in which the act
occurred or the State in which the accused now resides) 3
Most other nations appear, however, to prefer that the determina-
tion of whether a case is properly subject to domestic jurisdiction be
left to the Court itself,14 and that designation as an "interested State"
10. See, e.g., Comments of United States to Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment
Of An International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 10, U.N. Doc. A/AC.244/
l/add.2 (1995) [hereinafter Comments to the Ad Hoc Committee]. (". . . [draft statute]
frequently fails to uphold [national jurisdiction]"); Statement of H. Owada (Japan) to
U.N.GA 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/50/SR (1995) (urging
principal reliance upon national courts pursuant to principle of aut dedere, aut judicare);
Statement of C. Shiqiu (China) to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/50/SR (1995) ("Regrettably, [the complementarity principal] has not been fully
implemented in the operative part of the Statute and some provisions even appear to be
contrary to the principle.").
11. See Statement of C. Shiqiu (China) to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., supra note 10, at 3.
12. See Comments to the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 10, at 8-10, 3.
13. See id. at 19, $ 54-56.
14. The European Union, for example, has endorsed the principle that the Court
alone should carry out the principle of "complementarity" and decide whether national
forums are available and effective. See Statement by J.A. Yanez-Barneuvo (European
Union) to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/50/SR
(1995) ("Resort should be made to [the Court] where the Court has decided that national
systems were not available, or were ineffective."). See Statement of F. Wong (New Zea-
land) to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/50/SR.27
(1995) ("The decision to pursue individual criminals . . . should reside with the Court
itself.").
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be based upon traditional notions of territoriality and nationality. This
view has been urged particularly by smaller nations, which apparently
fear that larger nations will be tempted to use procedural devices to
block investigations and prosecutions and thereby avoid exposing in-
ternational criminal violations to an international forum.1
5
B. The Standard for Determining the Effectiveness of a State's Domes-
tic Procedures, Timing, and the Burden of Proof
Although there is a fragile consensus that the ICC should have
the capacity to determine whether its jurisdiction survives a concur-
rent prosecution by a State, there is general dissatisfaction with the
Draft's failure to address the implementation of this authority. Specifi-
cally, the draft fails to clarify the standard that the ICC must apply in
resolving challenges, when such challenges may be heard, and who
should bear the burden of proof
1. Standard for Evaluating Whether a State Forum is Available
and Effective
Official United States Comments have requested that the Draft
Statute be altered to limit the capacity of the ICC to determine that
an interested State's forum is not available and effective. Specifically,
the United States believes that a domestic forum should be considered
"unavailable" or "ineffective" only if: (1) the crime at issue falls outside
of that nation's domestic jurisdiction; (2) the State affirmatively de-
clines to exercise its jurisdiction without a full and adequate investiga-
tion, or in an "unreasonable" manner; or (3) the domestic forum's judi-
cial process is not "bona fide."16 United States officials contend that the
preamble should clarify that States have the primary duty to prosecute
these crimes, and that if a nation has an operating judicial system and
makes a bona fide effort to investigate and/or prosecute an offense that
otherwise falls within the ICC's jurisdiction, the ICC may not inter-
fere.'7 Under the United States' position, States with a bona fide judi-
15. See generally Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an Inter-
national Criminal Court. A/50/22 49, at 10 (1995) [hereinafter ICC Committee Report).
16. See Comments Received Pursuant to Paragraph 4 Of General Assembly Resolu-
tion 49/53 On The Establishment Of An International Criminal Court, Ad Hoc Commit-
tee on The Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at
9, U.N. Doc. A/AC.244/1/Add. 2 (1995) [hereinafter United States Comments]. See also
Statement of I.E. Ayewah (Nigeria), U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/50/SR
(1995) (Although Nigeria endorses complementarity, "[W]e would have difficulties with
the statue if a hierarchy is established in which the ICC would be superior to national
courts. Rather, recourse to the court should only be in the absence of national
jurisdiction.").
17. United States Comments, supra note 16; See also Statement by Jamison S.
Borek, Deputy Legal Advisor, United States Department of State, to U.N.G.A. 6th
Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/50/SR.27 (1995) [hereinafter State
Department Comments] ("The decision to pursue individual criminals ... should reside
1997
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cial process may thus, at any time, preempt an ICC investigation or
prosecution of crimes that fall within their domestic jurisdiction. s
The United States also appears anxious not to allow the standard
for determining whether a judicial process is "bona fide" to create a
significant loop-hole that would allow the Court to arrogate jurisdic-
tion from a competent State tribunal. In its comments to the Sixth
Committee, the State Department further expressed reluctance to al-
low the ICC to determine the extent of its own jurisdiction, unless
"bona fide procedure" is understood very narrowly. 9
The United States' position that "ineffectiveness" should be read
narrowly has some support in the ILC commentary to the Preamble.
The commentary States that the ICC "is intended to operate in cases
where there is no prospect of those persons being duly tried in na-
tional courts." The United States' stance thus would permit ICC juris-
diction only where a State court has no judicial procedure, refuses to
employ its procedure, or its procedure is not "bona fide" in that it of-
fers "no prospece of a person being "duly tried."
Other States as well have "stressed that the standards [for deter-
mining "availability" and "effectiveness"] were not intended . . .to al-
low the international criminal court to pass judgement on the opera-
tion of national courts in general."20 Accordingly, they favor a standard
that would limit the Court's discretion to deny the jurisdiction of State
tribunal to extraordinary cases where there is no likelihood of a "bona
fide" prosecution occurring.
2. The Timing of Challenges to Jurisdiction
As noted, the Statute provides that a State may challenge the ju-
risdiction of the Tribunal at any time after the prosecutor has initiated
an investigation until the time of trial. The United States urges that
the question of superior domestic jurisdiction should be addressable at
an even earlier stage of the proceedings. 2' Consistent with the United
with the Court itself").
18. The United States Department of State reiterated its official position regarding
the principle of complementarity at the 50th Session of the U.N. General Assembly Sixth
Committee. See State Department Comments, supra note 17, at 4. "It is.. .important to
elaborate further the principle of complementarity. We believe that bona fide national in-
vestigations and prosecutions will always be preferable, where possible. . . . [Accord-
ingly,] national jurisdiction should enjoy a presumption of regularity." Id. at 4.
19. Id. (M[it is a... difficult, intrusive and subtle judgment to say that a function-
ing national system is not bona fide"). Some States would go further than the United
States and apparently permit a State's mere representation that it has a bona fide judi-
cial process to suffice to block ICC jurisdiction. See, eg., Statement of H. Golan (Israel)
to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/50/SR.27 (1995)
(where State has prior jurisdiction to try [accused] for some or all of the alleged criminal
acts . .. it may reasonably claim priority.).
20. ICC Committee Report, supra note 15, at 9, 43.
21. Comments to the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 10, 52, at 19 ("It is essential
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States' view, States should be allowed to challenge jurisdiction "before
the prosecutor of the international criminal court initiated an investi-
gation because even the initiation of an investigation might interfere
with the exercise of national jurisdiction. 22 The United States also ad-
vocates an automatic stay of jurisdiction while a State conducts a bona
fide investigation.23
Under the United States' proposal (which to date has not been ad-
dressed in other State comments), a State could block any investiga-
tive action by the ICC prosecutor, by demonstrating that a "full," "ade-
quate," or "bona fide" investigation is proceeding in that State forum.
24
The United States, although it does not suggest how, maintains that
examination of these issues should be allowed to precede any investi-
gation at all, because decisions to investigate should not be "secondary
considerations which the court (or Prosecutor) has sole discretion to
decide."25 The United States Comments do not attempt to propose a
formal mechanism for accomplishing this right for pre-investigation ob-
jection. The Comments fairly suggest, however, adding either some
form of restriction on the prosecutor's ability to commence an investi-
gation at all, or some independent limitation by some entity other
than the ICC, or prosecutor, to prohibit further investigation.
3. Burden of Proof
The Draft Statute at present is silent on the issue of who should
bear the burden of proving whether the ICC properly has jurisdiction:
the party supporting State jurisdiction or the party contesting jurisdic-
tion. To the extent that States have addressed the issue, smaller na-
tions appear to support having the burden of proof reside with the na-
tion claiming jurisdiction to prove that its national system is available
and effective, and that the Court resolve the issue of its own jurisdic-
tion based upon this evidence.26
According to the Ad Hoc Committee Report, however, "some dele-
gations" expressed the view "that the burden of proof as to the appro-
priateness of an exception to the exercise of national jurisdiction
should be on the international criminal court."27 This view may be con-
sistent with the United States' suggestion that "national jurisdiction
to take account of the views of interested States at the earliest stage of investigation,
and not wait until there is a prosecution before the court.").
22. ICC Committee Report, supra note 20, at 10.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Statement of F. Wong (New Zealand) to U.N.GA 6th Comm., supra note 14,
at 2 ("the burden of rebutting the Court's superior claim to jurisdiction must lie with the
national authorities and not on the Court.").
27. ICC Committee Report, supra note 15, at 10, 49.
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should enjoy a presumption of regularity."28
C. Effect on State Court Proceedings
Finally, general concerns have been expressed by the United
States and other delegations that the effect of an ICC investigation
upon State Court proceedings should be more clearly defined. As
noted, consistent with its presumption in favor of State court proceed-
ings, the United States favors amending Articles 26 and 27 to require
the prosecutor and Court to take greater consideration of on-going do-
mestic investigations.29 The Ad Hoc Committee Report notes a sugges-
tion (possibly from the United States) that the Prosecutor should sus-
pend investigation and that the ICC suspend jurisdiction immediately
once an interested State informs the Court that it is conducting its
own bona fide investigation."
Several other States have also expressed reservations about the
doctrine of non bis in idern, as it would not only foreclose a State from
initiating a prosecution where the Court has found that prosecution
was ineffective, but it would prevent any other State from proceeding
with a prosecution once trial commenced. 31 These States noted that, in
most cases, national judicial systems are more highly developed and
thus more effective than the ICC. The States thus questioned the wis-
dom of foreclosing prosecutions in these jurisdictions, simply because
the first nation to object to jurisdiction lacked a bona fide system.
IV. ILA SUB-COMMIT"rEE WORKING GROUP ANALYSIS
To date, the ILA working group on complementarity of the Sub-
Committee on the Permanent International Criminal Court has not at-
tempted to form a consensus on the various concerns expressed about
the ILC Draft Statute. The following issues, however, may warrant
discussion and further consideration.
A. Court's Power to Decide Its Own Jurisdiction
As noted, the ILC Draft Statute provides that the Court has the
capacity to decide whether a domestic forum has exclusive jurisdiction.
In general, it may be preferable to retain this portion of the ILC Draft
Statute, notwithstanding the United States government's and other
nations' concerns about giving the Court this authority.
Granting the Court authority to decide the question of jurisdiction
is consistent with the function of the ICC. One key purpose of creating
an International Criminal Court is to afford the international commu-
28. State Department Comments, supra note 17.
29. See United States Comments, supra note 16, at 10, l 9-10.
30. ICC Committee Report, supra note 15, at 10, 51.
31. Id. at 9, 43.
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nity as a whole an opportunity to assure that individuals who commit
crimes of an international character are brought to justice. To permit
domestic courts to assume this responsibility, without an international
instrument's ability to examine the effectiveness of those domestic
courts, may undermine an important function of creating the ICC.
In addition, reservations about permitting the Court to decide its
own jurisdiction may derive less from structural notions about the ap-
propriateness of conferring this power to the ICC, than from a lack of
confidence in the Court generally, or in the adequacy of specific rules
to limit the ability of the Court to overreach. The better approach to
allaying these concerns may be not to assign competence elsewhere,
but to tighten up procedures by which the Court may examine its own
jurisdiction.
B. The Factors that Define an 'Interested State" for Purposes of Chal-
lenging ICC Jurisdiction
It also may be preferable not to disturb the ILC Draft Statute's
current formulation of whether a State qualifies as "interested" for
purposes of asserting jurisdiction. Under current international law,
there are several theories of jurisdiction that may support a nation's
assertion of competence to try an international matter.32 Although
valid concerns may exist about the appropriateness of certain theories
of jurisdiction relative to others, the Statute of the ICC appears to be
an awkward vehicle for attempting to select among these theories, or
to establish a ranking of claims of jurisdiction. Consensus is more
likely to develop through practice rather than through theory.
Accordingly, it appears proper to allow the ICC to decide, case-by-
case, whether a State's asserted theory of jurisdiction is appropriate,
and thus whether the State's judicial system is "available." This allows
for a more deliberate evolution of the law of State jurisdiction. At the
same time, it may have significant tactical benefits. It may give the
ICC flexibility to cede jurisdiction to the State with the "best" theory of
jurisdiction where several States wish to claim jurisdiction, i.e., the
State with the greatest stake in assuring effective prosecution.
C. Preference for Domestic Jurisdiction
In general, the consensus favoring domestic jurisdiction (where
available and effective) seems sensible. The function of the ICC is to
improve the effectiveness of prosecution of international crimes. To the
extent that an ICC prosecution would merely duplicate the efforts of a
State (or would only marginally improve the likelihood of successful
prosecution), the expense, effort, and possible offense to a sovereign's
32. See, e.g., Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, reprinted in
29 AM. J. INT'L L 435 (Supp. 1935), (addressing theories of Territorial, Nationality, Pro-
tective, Universal, and Passive Personality Jurisdiction).
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judicial system, is probably not justified. In addition, given that State
systems are generally better developed at this point (and the risk of
ICC preemption may spur them to even more effective prosecution in
the future), the concept of the ICC as a supplemental court - at least
in theory - seems proper.
D. Standard, Timing, and Burden of Proof
1. Standard for "Unavailable" or "Ineffective"
As noted, several States have complained that the standard by
which the ICC may determine that a State's claim of jurisdiction will
not be accepted is presently ambiguous. This criticism appears well-
taken. The terms "unavailable" or "ineffective" require greater elabora-
tion to give States comfort that the Court will not overreach in refus-
ing to cede jurisdiction to a State that seeks to proceed with a bona
fide prosecution. The ILC may wish to address this matter through
commentary to the Statute.
The ILC commentary may define "unavailable" as referring to sit-
uations in which: (1) the forum does not provide for jurisdiction over
the crime; (2) the exercise of jurisdiction would exceed the limits of in-
ternationally recognized extra-territorial jurisdiction; or (3) the forum
is in a State of unrest such that its judicial system is not operating in
a reliable fashion.
The commentary may define "ineffective" as referring to situations
in which: (1) the forum provides a standard of guilt, or punishment,
which is incompatible with international norms; or (2) the State in
question has not demonstrated an actual intention to prosecute, or to
conduct, a full and prompt investigation.
Including these clarifications in the commentary to the ILC Draft
Statute may go a long way towards alleviating concerns expressed by
the United States and other nations about giving the Court too much
discretion.
2. Timing
The United States' proposal to permit challenges to jurisdiction
before an investigation has not, as yet, provoked much interest among
other nations, and may not be perceived as particularly compelling.
The marginal expense to the Court of a precipitous investigation, or
the marginal "interference" with domestic investigations caused by a
potentially duplicative ICC inquiry, may not seem sufficient to warrant
adding another whole layer of delay and administrative procedure.
To the extent that such a proposal is to be incorporated, the ILC
may consider proposing a "stay" procedure. A State, upon learning that
an ICC investigation is being considered, and that such an investiga-
tion would be unnecessary or inappropriate, may request an order of
the Court staying the prosecutor from conducting those portions of the
VOL. 25:2
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investigation that the State finds objectionable. The standard for
granting such a stay would be that there is a reasonable probability
that the State investigation will be adequate, and that further investi-
gation by the prosecutor would cause an undue burden to the State or
the Court. This stay application could be addressed on an expedited
basis. By setting a relatively high standard of proof, the "stay" proce-
dure may limit State attempts to use challenges to jurisdiction as a
means of delaying or compromising investigations. Absent compelling
reasons, an investigation could go forward until the Court had an op-
portunity to consider its jurisdiction.
3. The Burden of Proof
At present the Draft Statute does not allocate the burden of proof
for establishing domestic jurisdiction over a case pending before the
ICC. The Draft Statute should address this omission, and formally al-
locate the burden of proof as between the ICC prosecutor and a State
asserting primary jurisdiction. Although arguments exist for allocating
the burden to either party, three considerations in particular may
favor having the burden assigned to the State.
First, the issue of State jurisdiction will generally arise only after
a State has determined to initiate or continue a prosecution that will
deprive the ICC of further authority to review the matter. Because the
State has made the choice to assert its superior jurisdiction, it should
be required to demonstrate that it has taken this action in good faith,
and not simply as a means of depriving the ICC of jurisdiction.
Second, as a practical matter, the State will possess the best evi-
dence concerning the effectiveness of its own system; thus, requiring it
- rather than the prosecutor - to produce this evidence will likely re-
sult in a more informed decision.
Third, politically, it may be offensive to require the ICC prosecutor
to present affirmative evidence impugning the availability or effective-
ness of a State's judicial system. As a matter of decorum and respect
to the State, it appears more appropriate to deny State jurisdiction on
the basis of a failure to satisfy the burden of proof, as opposed to an
affirmative conclusion that the system is inadequate.
To the extent that there are objections to this allocation of the
burden of proof, these concerns may be mitigated by the statute in ap-
plying a relatively low standard of proof, such as the preponderance of
the evidence standard.
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing is offered as a basis for further discussion among
the ILA Working Group and Committee on a Permanent International
Criminal Court about the doctrine of complementarity. As noted, de-
spite criticisms that have been directed at the Statute's failure to fully
define the principle of complementarity, the general principle appears
1997
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sound. It should be encouraged with appropriate refinements, includ-
ing some or all of those discussed above.
